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NOTE
INTERSTATE PUBLIC USE: AN ISSUE OCCURRING
IN CONDEMNATION FOR INTERSTATE
POWER LINES
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE CONTEXT OF THE ISSUE
Americans consume prodigious amounts of energy each year.,
In particular, Americans have been consuming accelerating
amounts of electricity.2 In order to satisfy the increasing demand
for electricity, public utilities must constantly construct additional
generating facilities. And likewise, to fuel these new power plants,
the utilities must rely increasingly on new sources of energy.8
For utility companies, the vast coal reserves lying beneath the
west-central states promise to be an economical source of new en-
ergy.4 Yet, the coal rests far from the energy-hungry population
centers." The efficient utilitization of the coal, therefore, resolves
itself into a question of logistics. Essentially, the question becomes:
should the utilities transport the coal to power plants located near
the spots of demand, or, alternatively, should the utilities situate
the power plants near the coal reserves and transmit the electricity
generated therefrom to the spots of demand?
1. America's energy consumption has been Increasing at a healthy rate since World
War II. In the last decade America's annual energy consumption grew at four times the
rate of the population. The energy crunch of 1973 has made an impression in consumer
use of energy, but old patterns are difficult to alter. The projected energy demand for the
United States shows rising use at a more modest rate. See generally NORTHERN GREAT
PLAINS RESOURCE PROGRAM, EFFECTS OF COAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHERN GREAT
PLAINS 1, 17-24 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NGPRP]. Also, for an excellent discussion of
the economic ramifications of America's voracious energy appetite, see Walker & Large,
The Economics of Energy Extravagance, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 963 (1975).
2. America's consumption of electricity in the last decade Increased at a rate over
seven times the growth rate of population. See Walker & Large, supra note 1. Electricity
consumption comprises one-fifth of all the energy used in the United States and is at-
tractive as an energy form for two reasons. First, it Is a convenient form of energy that
can be put to many uses. Also, as a secondary form of energy, it can be produced by a
variety of primary forms of energy, such as coal, natural gas, petroleum, and nuclear
power. See H. LANDSBERG & S. SCHURR, ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES: SOURCES, USES,
AND POLICY ISSUES ch. 6 (1st ed. 1968).
S. See fd.; NGPRP, supra note 1, at 14-22.
4. The Northern Great Plains states (Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming, South Da-
kota, and Nebraska) contain 37 percent of the nation's total known coal reserves. NGPRP,
supra note 1, at 17. Although the consumption of coal In proportion to the other forms of
energy has steadily declined since World War II, the recent rise in the cost of oil, which
had become the major replacement for coal, has stimulated renewed interest in coal. Id.
at 17-18.
5. Id. at 2, 17-18.
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Several utilities have already selected the second alternative
in an effort to market electricity generated by lignite.6 In order
to reduce transmission costs, these utilities intend to erect ultrahigh
voltage direct current transmission lines (D.C. lines) to convey
electricity from the power plant site to the area of energy demand.7
The terminus of a D.C. line must be located near the point or area
of major power distribution; otherwise, the economic feasibility of
using a D.C. line is destroyed.8 Furthermore, a D.C. line must run
untapped to a terminus, where expensive equipment will convert
the direct current into alternating current to be distributed over
conventional power lines." Due to the large distances between the
lignite reserves and areas of major use, any D.C. line used for the
above purpose will inevitably involve transmission corridors which
cross state borders. Since transmission line right-of-ways are com-
monly acquired by condemnation, ° and since condemnation re-
quires a public use, this method of energy allocation raises the in-
triguing issue of interstate "public use."
The reason for [the low use of Northern Great Plains' coal compared to use
of the coal from other areas of the United States] is that the NGP coal fields
are much more distant from most of [the electric generating] plants than
are the eastern and midwestern fields. The plants are concentrated in eastern
and midwestern power load centers. Even with the greater production cost
per ton of eastern and midwestern coal . . . the higher delivered price per
BTU at major load centers has kept NGP coal at a competitive disadvantage.
Id at 17.
6. Eleven of the fifty-three power plants proposed to be built in the NGP states In
the next fifteen years are to be fueled by lignite. Ten of the eleven are proposed to be
located in North Dakota. Id. at 36.
7. See POWER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., POWER TRANsMIssION TECHNOLOGY, UNDERGROTJND
AND OVERHEAD; A STUDY FOR THE POWER FACILITIES E vALUATION COUNCIL, STATE OF CON-
NECTICUT at N-5, N-6 (1975). Hereinafter cited as POWER TRANSMISSION TECHNOLOGY.
8. D.C. lines are a novel concept in electrical transmission compared to conventional
A.C. power lines which have been the traditional mode of transmitting electricity. The
primary stimulus for the recent interest in D.C. lines is the economy of their transmission
costs. Unlike conventional power lines, which use two wires, some D.C. lines require only
one wire. This provides great savings in the cost of the line. Because direct-current offers
less resistance to the flow of electricity, the D.C. line is a more efficient conduit for trans-
mitting electricity. Furthermore, direct current is more compatible to insulation. In turn.
this saves power and reduces maintenance costs. These economies increase directly with
the increase in length and load of a D.C. line.
Because electricity is both generated and consumed in A.C. form, current trans-
mitted along a D.C. line must be converted twice before it can be marketed. Terminal
rectifiers to convert the power must be -located at each end of the line. The rectifiers are
extremely expensive, costing about $35/kw terminal (a total of approximately 70 million
dollars for a 1000 mw line). Therefore, to be commercially feasible, a D.C. line must be
used only when the length and load of the line create large enough savings to balance
the enormous costs of the line. Since it would be senseless to transport electricity else-
where without a concomitant need for its use, It is essential that the primary use of the
electricity transmitted by a D.C. line be in the area of its terminus. Otherwise, the econ-
omy of the D.C. line is lost. See generally PowER TRANsMIssION TECHNOLOGy, supra note
7, at H-9 to H-10, N-5 to N-6.
9. Although there are a number of reasons why D.C. lines presently must run from
terminal to terminal untapped, the main reason appears to be that the state of the art
has not developed a circuit breaker to control the D.C. current. At present, a D.C. line
must rely on complicated interconnections with A.C. lines to serve this function. See id.,
at N-6.
10. Easements for power lines may also be acquired by purchase.
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B. A Focus ON THE ISSUE OF INTERSTATE PUBLIC USE
This very question of interstate public use and electric trans-
mission lines has materialized in a perplexing case, Square Butte
Electric Cooperative v. Hilke". 11 Square Butte Electric Cooperatfve,
a North Dakota cooperative, newly organized by interests of Minn-
kota Electric, a Minnesota based cooperative, sought to invoke
North Dakota's power of eminent domain12 in order to obtain a
right of way for a proposed D.C. line. The proposed D.C. line was
part of a project planned by Square Butte Electric Cooperative5
to erect power plants near North Dakota's lignite reserves and
transmit the resulting electricity to Minnesota. 14 The D.C. line was
to run untapped from Center, North Dakota to terminus; in Duluth,
Minnesota. 15 After the current had been converted at the terminal,
the electricity was to be distributed over conventional lines, pri-
marily to local users. 6
At trial, Square Butte Electric Cooperative claimed that con-
struction of the proposed D.C. line would provide the following ben-
efits to North Dakota: a, back-up reserve of power, from which
North Dakota member utilities might draw in an emergency;' a
potential reduction in electricity costs for North Dakota consumers;
a potential option to supply a portion of the electricity sent over
the D.C. line to North Dakota consumers;' 8 a potential source of
11. Civil No. 24097 (N.D. 4th dist., filed Aug. 14, 1975).
12. For a look at North Dakota's constitutional and statutory provisions outlining the
application of the power of eminent domain, see N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.D., CENT.
CODE ch. 32-15. See generally, Guy, Land Condemnation: A Comparative Survey of North
Dakota Statutory Law, 51 N.D.L. REv. 387 (1974).
13. It might be more accurate to credit the- plan to Minnkota Cooperative; at least this
is the view taken by the trial court. For example, Square Butte Electric Cooperative re-
tains only one employee, a general manager, and it has entered into agreements with
Minnkota which essentially leaves all the managerial and operational decisions to Minn-
kota.
14. Square Butte Electric Cooperative is obligated by contract to furnish all the power
from the line to Minnkota beginning when the line becomes operational and continuing
for seven years. Since Minnkota Cooperative principally serves Minnesota, it is logical to
assume that the major portion of the power will be supplied to Minnesota residents.
15. The line will travel a distance of four hundred miles, two hundred of which lie in
North Dakota.
16. This is the finding of the trial court.
17. Nine regional reliability councils were formed after the 1965 Northeastern Blackout.
They are responsible for the following: to develop reliability standards; exchange infor-
mation, provide information to regulatory agencies, and generally promote power re-
liability. PowER TRANSMIssION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 7, at K-5.
North Dakota and Minnesota lie within the Mid-Continent Area Reliability Coordi-
nation Agreement (MARCA) council. Although these councils are not mandated by law,
most utilities join in order to receive the benefits of membership. When a utility joins a
council, that utility adds its power to the reliability network. Thus, Square Butte argued
that its membership in MARCA would, in turn, increase the reliability of other North
Dakota utilities who are also members of MARCA. See generally id., at K-1 to K-6.
18. North Dakota potentially could receive power from the proposed, lines in two ways.
First, since at least one North Dakota cooperative belongs to Minnkota Cooperative, con-
ceivably, power sent to Minnesota might be returned to North Dakota residents by this
route. However, the decision to supply power to individual member utilities is a decision
for the board of directors of Minnkota. Thus, it is possible that North Dakota utilities-
and consequently North Dakota residents, might be prevented from receiving any power
from the proposed D.C. line. Second, an agreement between Square Butte Electric Co-
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electricity to meet North Dakota's future demands; and a stabili-
zation of conventional power lines in North Dakota. Square Butte
contended that these alleged benefits demonstrated a public use to
North Dakota. The defendant landowners, in turn, alleged that the
plaintiff had not shown sufficient public use to support condemna-
tion. The trial court held that North Dakota law19 required a show-
ing of substantial benefit to sustain a public use, and that the bene-
fits adduced by Square Butte were too remote, speculative, and in-
direct to provide evidence of substantial benefit.2 0  Consequently,
the court held that the taking of the defendant's land for an ease-
ment for the proposed D.C. line was impermissible because it did
not serve a public use.21 The case is now on appeal to the North
Dakota Supreme Court.
While the issue of interstate public use is not novel, it has been
subjected to scant analysis by the legal authorities.2 2 Indeed, courts
in many states have never faced the issue. Yet, Square Butte pre-
sents a situation which, in the future, is likely to appear with in-
creased frequency. For this reason, it is the objective of this note
to canvass the legal authority upon the issue 'of interstate public
use in an attempt to collect the existing law in this area. Emphasis
will be placed on condemnation for interstate power lines. In addi-
tion, solutions to the situation posed by Square Butte21 will be sug-
gested.
II. AN ORIENTATION TO THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE
As a legal construct, "public use ' 24 defies any single defini-
operative and Minnkota provides that after seven years Square Butte will acquire an op-
tion to take a proportion of the power fed into the proposed D.C. line. Square Butte, In
turn, might sell this power to North Dakota utilities or its own customers.
19. This appears to be the first case in North Dakota in which the exercise of eminent
domain has been challenged on the ground that the taking lacked public use.
20. Specifically, the trial court found that: "there is no substantial evidence" of future
use; "no evidence" of reduction in the cost of electricity to North Dakota consumers; the
evidence of increased reliability is not "direct enough to support" a finding of public use;
the "testimony regarding the stabilization of the A.C. lines within the state of North Da-
kota i- not persuasive enough to supply public use." Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Hilken,
Civil No. 24097 (N.D. 4th dist., filed Aug. 14, 1975).
21. Id.
22. See generally 1 P. NIcHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.112[3] to [41
[hereinafter cited as NIcHOLS] ; 26 AM. Jur. 2d Eminent Domtain § 14 (1966) ; Annot.,
90 A.L.R. 1032 (1934) ; Comment, Constitutidnal Law: Eminent Domain: Power Of One
State To Condemn Land For A Use In Another State, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 88 (1927).
23. Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Hilken, Civil No. 24097 (N.D. 4th dist., filed Aug. 14,
1975).
24. For a closer look at the concept of "public use," see Nichols, The Meaning of Public
Use In The Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REv. 615 (1940) ; Comment, Rex Non
Protest Pecarre? The Decline And Fall Of The Public Use Limitation On Eminent Domain,
76 DicK L.J. 266 (1971) ; Note, "Public Use" As A Limitation On The Exercise Oi The
Eminent Domain Power by Private Entities, 50 IOWA L. REv. 799 '(1965) ; Comment, The
Public Use Doctrine "Advance Requiem" Revisited, LAW & Soc. ORDER 688 (1969) ; Com-
ment, The Public Use Limitation On Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J.
599 (1949).
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tion,'25 its meaning being ,fraught with confusion and contradiction. 26
It has been said that:
No question has ever been submitted to the courts upon
which there is greater variety and conflict of reasoning and
results then that presented as to the meaning of the words
"public use.". . . The reasoning is in many cases as unsat-
isfactory as the results have been uncertain. The beaten
path of precedent to which courts, when in doubt, seek re-
fuge, here furnishes no safe guide. . .. The authorities are
so diverse and conflicting, that no matter which road the
court may take it will be sustained, and opposed, by about
an equal number of the decided cases. In this dilemma, the
meaning must, in every case, be determined by the com-
mon sense of each individual judge who has the power of de-
ciding it.27
Nevertheless, enough salient features of "public use" emerge from
the case law to provide a rudimentary understanding of the doc-
trine28
A. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE
Eminent domain29 is an inherent incident of 'sovereignty, 0 need-
ing no constitutional authorization. 31 Hence, constitutional provi-
sions concerning eminent domain delimit the power of the govern-
ment to exercise eminent domain, but they do not occasion the
power . 2 Accordingly, the fifth amendment phrase "private proper-
ty shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation" 3
25. Perhaps the term "public use," by nature, is undefinable due to its protean charac-
ter. "The notion of what is public use changes from time to time. Public use expands with
the new needs created by the advance of civilization .... Dairyland Power Coop. v.
Brennan, 248 Minn. 556, 566, 82 N.W.2d 56, 63 (1957), quoting State ex. rel. Twin City
Bildg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 16, 176 N.W. 159, 161 (1920). Furthermore,
"[t]he term 'public use' is flexible, and cannot be limited to the public use known at the
time of the forming of the constitution." Id., quoting Steward v. Great N. Ry. Co., 65
Minn. 515, 517, 68 N.W. 208, 209 (1896).
26. See, Comment, The Publis Use Limitation and Eminent Domain: An Advance
Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 606 (1949).
27. Id., quoting Dayton G. & S. Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 400-01 (1876).
28. Perhaps the fundamental maxim concerning public use Is that, even though it can-
not be precisely defined, it still can be recognized-"I know it when I see it."
29. Some claim that the principle of eminent domain is documented in the Old Testa-
ment. The Romans appear to have recognized the concept. In English law the idea of emi-
nent domain is believed to have originated in the King's prerogative to build defenses,
construct roads, and preserve the royal welfare. The term itself is credited to Hugo Grotius
as result of his use, in 1625, of the words dominium eminens to express the concept. How-
ever traced, the power of eminent domain has been exercised throughout history by most
governments. See NICHOLS §§ 1.2[1] to [2].
30. Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1923); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
(1 Otto) 364, 374 (1875).
31. See NICHOLS § 1.14[1].
32. See NICHOLS §§ 7.7[1], 7.311l]. See, e.g., United States v. City of Tiffin, 190 F.
279, 280 (N.D. Ohio 1911) ; Burnett v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 147 Neb. 458,
465, 23 N.W.2d 661, 666 (1946) (dictum).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The requirement that public use be demonstrated for the
taking of private property har been applied to the states through the due process clause
568 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
has been interpreted 34 to require a showing of public use neces-
sitating any taking.3 5 Therefore, private property may not be tak-
en for a private use, 6 nor may private property be taken for a
purpose which principally serves a private use and only incidentally
advances a public use.3 7 However, a taking which forwards a pub-
lic use will not be prevented because it also serves an incidental
private use.s
It is clear that private property cannot be taken for a private
use.3 9 If land is taken by condemnation and subsequently put to a
private use, the taking violates the fifth amendment and is uncon-
stitutional. 40 A state, therefore, must retain sufficient control over
the condemned land to enable it to compel its devotion to the "pub-
lic use" for which it was taken. 41 However, courts rarely deny the
exercise of eminent domain on these grounds. Instead, courts gen-
erally sustain a taking in such situations because the constitutional
authority invoked to validate the taking is felt to provide sufficient
power to compel devotion of the land taken to a "public use.14 2
B. PUBLIC USE DICHOTOMY
The confusion surrounding the definition of "public use" is trace-
able to the construction of the components of the phrase. "Use" has
in the 14th amendment. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) ;
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) ; cf. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 20 (1885).
But see Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 97, 105 (1877).
34. Although there exists no provision in the U.S. Constitution declaring that property
may not be taken for a private use, courts consistently have found that the fifth amend-
ment prohibits the taking of property for a private use. This has been based on niegative
implication. Thus, property can be taken only for a "public use." See, e.g., United States
v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282
(1893).
35. See NICHOLS § 7.1.
36. North Dakota's Constitution states: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation having been first made to, or paid in to court
for the owner .. " N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 14. Several state constitutions provide specifi-
cally that property may not be taken for private use. See, e.g., ALA. CONsT. art. 1, § 28;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 23; WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 16.
37. See NICHOLS § 7.222[4).
88. See NICHOLS § 7.222.
89. See note 33 supra.
40. Id.
41. See Lakeead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, 340 Mich. 25, 64 N.W.2d 903, 912 (1954); c!.
Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927).
42. See Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 595, 115 P. 682, 686 (1911)
(dictum). In that case the taking related to the condemnation of land necessary to create
a source of water power to generate electricity. Electricity from the project would be also
used out-of-state. The court stated :
If, after the company shall have procured ground, rights of way for trans-
mission lines, and reservoirs for storage purposes, and, inaugurated its sys-
tem, it should use its electrical energy in another state for use therein, and
decline to supply any of the demands of the citizens and industries of this
state, then there would be occasion for complaint, and in a proper case the
courts, in the exercise of the constitutional power reserved to the state to
"regulate and control" the agencies on which the right of eminent domain is
conferred, would command, and, if necessary, reach out and compel, those
NOTES
been considered to mean either "employment" or "advantage ' ' 4
while "public" has been interpreted to mean most, many, or even
a few citizens. Nonetheless, the law has taken two approaches in
defining the phrase "public use." 44 The older, narrower test, now
a minority view, 45 equates "public use" with "use by the public. '" 4
Under this test, a use cannot be declared to be a "public use" un-
less the public will enjoy a right to the actual use of the facility or
service for which the land was taken.4 7 Public benefit or advan-
tage is insufficient; the public must be. entitled to actual use.48
Moreover, under this view the term "public use" implies "use of
many" but not necessarily use by all.4 9 Therefore, the use may
be limited to a small community and still be a "public use" as long
as right to the use is held in common and not just by a particular
individual .50
The newer and more liberal approach associates the phrase
"public use" with "public benefit." 51 "Public benefit" is defined as
anything which offers a public advantage or furthers a public in-
terest.5 2 Under this view the public need not be entitled to actual
use, but the use must promote some general public interest or pro-
vide a public service.53 In fact, under this approach "public use"
has been construed so broadly that it has even been defined as any
use "conducive to community prosperity.' 4 Furthermore, under
this view it is not essential that the entire community or a consid-
erable portion thereof directly participate in or enjoy the "public
benefit" for the use to constitute a "public use." 55
agencies to direct the exercise of these public uses to the service of the
state and its citizens and industries.
Id. For a suggestion as to the right of a state to do so when this would affect Interstate
commerce, see Notes and Comment, Constitutional Law: Eminent Domain: Power Of One
State To Condemn Land For A Use In Another State, 13 CORNELL L.J. 88, 92, n.18 (1927),
citing Blue, Power To Restrict Sale Of A State's Natural Products Into Other States, THE
LAWYER AND BANKER 129 (1909), which states:
The writer advances the opinion that a corporation exercising the power of
eminent domain could be compelled to supply the home state, even if this in-
cidentally involved denial of the right to dispose of such products outside the
state. This would be a reasonable exercise of the police power and a mere in-
direct burden on interstate commerce.
43. NICHOLS §§ 7.2[1] to [2].
44. Id. North Dakota has not decided' specifically which approach it will apply.
45. See Comment, Balancing Public Purposes: A Neglected Problem in Condemnation,
35 ALBANY L. REV. 769, 72 (1971).
46. See generally Nichols, The Mcaning Of Public Use In The Law Of Eminent Domain,
20 B.U.L. REV. 615 (1940).
47. NICHOLS § 7.2[1].
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. For a review of a specific application of this approach as it bears on the law of
"public use," see Comment, Public Use as a Limitation On The Power of Eminent Domain
in Texas, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (1966).
51. See generally Comment, Rex Non Protest Pecarre? The Decline and Fall of the Public
Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, 76 DICK L. REV. 266 (1971).
52. NICHOLS § 7.2[2].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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C. DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC USE As A LEGISATIVE AND JUDICIAL
PREROGATIVE
Although the power of eminent domain inheres in sovereignty,
it may not be exercised without a legislative act authorizing its ap-
plication5 6 Typically, this occurs when a legislature delegates the
power of eminent domain to a governmental agency 7 or to a pri-
vate enterprise.58 The application of a legislative delegation, how-
ever, does not serve a "public use" unless it meets two constitutional
criteria. 59 First, the legislative delegation, on its face, must consti-
tutionally grant the power of eminent domain for a public use.6 0
Second, the actual application of the statutory delegation must con-
stitutionally serve a public use.6 1 As the guardians of constitution-
ality, the courts are the ultimate arbiters of both these questions.
Nevertheless, legislative judgment is given great weight in de-
ciding the existence of public use. Once a legislature has authorized
the exercise of the power of eminent domain for a particular use,
the courts view the. legislative action as an implicit declaration
that the use designated be considered a public use.6 2 Accordingly,
a legislative declaration of public use will be presumed reasonable,
and consequently valid, unless facts showing otherwise can be de-
monstrated.6 3 Thus, the question of determining public use is bas-
ically a legislative prerogative.
III. POWER LINES AS A PUBLIC USE
The recognition that power lines serve a public use, is obvious-
ly connected with electricity's value as a "public use." Because
electricity possesses -such an inherent capacity to. serve domestic
uses, it conventionally is considered a public use unless produced
primarily to further some private rather than public use. Since
power lines provide the sole means of transporting electricity to
consumers, they have generally been considered to serve a public
use6 4 In keeping with the before-mentioned general principles, each
member of the public need not be actually benefited by the con-
56. See NICHOLS § 7.4; Note, "Public Use" As a Limitation On The Exercise Of The
Eminent Domain Power By Private Entities, 50 IOWA L. REv. 799, 799-800 (1965).
57. For a rumination on the results of delegation of eminent domain to government
agencies, see Comment, Balancing Public Purposes: A Neglected Problem in Condemna-
tion, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 769 (1971).
58. See generally Note, "Public Use" As A Limitation On The Exercise of the Emi-
nent Domain Power By Private Entities, 50 IOWA L. REV. 799 (1965).
59. Id. at 807.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 807-09.
62. See NICHOLS § 7.4[1]. Indeed, "when the legislature has spoken, the public Interest
has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
63. See Adam v. Greenwich Water Co., 138 Conn. 205, 83 A.2d 177, 182-83 (1951).
64. See, e.g., Vittetoe v. Iowa S. Util. Co., 255 Iowa 805, 123 N.W.2d 878 (1963) ; Rock-
lngham County Light & Power v. Hobbs, 72 N.H. 531, 58 A. 46 (1904).
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struction of the power line for it to serve a public use, so long as
each member of the public shares an equal right with all others to
use the power line. 65 The fact that but one patron will be served
by a power line when built does not destroy its public nature.68 The
transmission of electricity by a wholesale producer for distribution
exclusively to affiliated power utilities, which, in turn, market the
electricity to the -domestic user, is nonetheless a public use even
though the wholesaler's power lines never actually supply the ulti-
mate consumer. 67 Furthermore, a power line which does not directly
supply any customers serves a public use if it is constructed to im-
prove the reliability of electric service within a power system.6 8
However, a one-way power line transmitting electricity from one
state to another and providing no alleged benefits to the first state
has been found to serve no "public use" in the state in which it
originated.6 9 In general, the case law suggests that where the
construction of a power line provides any benefit at all, it consti-
tutes a valid public use.
IV. INTERSTATE PUBLIC USE
The issue of interstate public use may arise as a question of
federal or state law.7 0 As a question of federal law, the issue of in-
terstate public use involves three considerations. First, any exer-
cise of the federal power of eminent domain must be preceded by
a congressional mandate authorizing the exercise of the power for
a particular purpose.71 Second, constitutionally, Congress can auth-
orize the exercise of eminent domain only for those uses which re-
late to mtaintaining express or implied federal powers.7 2 Finally,
the particular use to which the congressional authorization is act-
ually applied must advance a legitimate federal power.7 3 When
these elements are present a court will 'ordinarily inquire no further,
and therefore, the interstate use in question becomes a valid "pub-
lic use. ' ' 74 Where adequate federal law exists to sustain an inter-
state public use, there is no practical reason to rely on state law. 75
65. NICHOLS § 7.522[3].
66. Montana Power Co. v. Bokma, 153 Mont. 460, 457 P.2d 769 (1969).
67. E.g., Shedd v. Northern Ind. Pub. Ser. Co., 205 Ind. 35, 188 N.E. 322 (1934)
Dairyland Power Coop. v. Brennan, 248 Minn. 556, 82 N.W.2d 56 (1957).
68. See Dunk v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n., 210 Pa. Super. 183, 232 A.2d1 231
(Super. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 434 Pa. 41, 252 A.2d 589 (1969).
69. Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 195 So. 2d 368 (Fla. App. 1967).
70. It should be pointed out that, by nature, all federal condemnation Involves inter-
state public use. On the other hand, state condemnation involves interstate public use only
when the taking also serves a public use in another state.
71. NICHOLS § 4.9 (footnotes deleted states) : "The absence of proper prior statutory au-
thority for the exercise of eminent domain or subsequent notification thereof constitutes a
denial of the substantive element of due process."
72. See NICHOLS § 3.11.
73. See note 54 supra.
74. Bernan v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
75. The federal power of eminent domain cannot be restricted In any manner by the
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Despite its simplicity as a question of federal law, the issue of
interstate public use has been litigated most often as a question of
state law. Congressional "action" typically assures a valid inter-
state "public use,"7 6 but Congress has authorized the use of emi-
nent domain only for certain limited purposes.7 7 As a result, a mul-
titude of takings involving interstate public use have turned to state
law for their justification. States, jealous of their prerogatives, are
understandably cautious in approving a taking for a "public use"
which also serves another state. Consequently, in such situations
interstate public use is more likely to be placed in controversy. As
a result, -state court decisions have been responsible for postula-
ting most of the law relating to the issue of interstate public use.
The fact that different jurisdictions, in a collage of cases, have cre-
ated most of the law in this area unfortunately means that what-
ever coherence can be discerned in the law of interstate public use,
invariably is shadowed by some irreconcilable inconsistency.
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERSTATE PUBLIC USE
Eminent domain is an intrinsic attribute of sovereignty.78 The
power exists solely to accomplish those governmental purposes es-
sential to the maintenance of sovereignty 7 9 and it may be exer-
cised only to accommodate those purposes. 0 Because eminent do-
main is created by sovereignty, sovereignty defines its scope.8 1
Hence, in the case of individual states eminent domain is limited
to jurisdictional boundaries; whereas, for the federal government,
the scope of its exercise extends to all fifty states and to the terri-
tories of the United States.
2
Since a state may exercise the power of eminent domain only
to serve its own purposes, the relationship between out-of-state and
in-state uses becomes important to the exercise of eminent domain
for an interstate public use. Accordingly, the authorities8 3 have ar-
state; it is entirely Independent. NICHOLS § 2.121. Thus where "federal" public use is
found, the question of "state" public use becomes immaterial if the other prerequisites for
a valid "federal" condemnation are present.
76. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
77. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 831c(h) (1970) (Tennessee Valley Authority authorized to
condemn land for the purposes of the act) ; 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1970) (natural gas com-
panies authorized to condemn realty for the. purpose of constructing a natural gas pipe-
line). For a comprehensive overview of the federal taking in practice, see J. MOORE, 7
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 71A (1975).
78. NICHOLS § 2.111.
79. Id. states:
The power of eminent domain in sovereignty exists only for its own purpose.
The fundamental principle which forms the base upon which the power rests
does not permit the exercise of the power for purposes other than to enable
the state to effect its own proper ends....
80. Id.
81. See Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581 (1923) ; Georgia v.
Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) ; cf. Salisbury Mills v. Forsaith, 57 N.H. 126 (1876).
82. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1876).
83. See NICHOLS § 2.112[4] ; Comment, Constitutional Law: Eminent Domain: Power Of
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ticulated three categories into which the relationships of interstate
public use may be placed:
1. Exclusively extraterritorial use-where land is to be taken
by one state for the sole use of another state.
2. Primarily intraterritorial use, incidental extraterritorial use-
where land is to be taken in one state for the primary use of that
state, but with an incidental use in another state.
3. Primarily extraterritorial use, incidental intraterritorial use-
where land is to be taken in one state for the primary use of another
state, but with an incidental use in the condemning -state.
8 4
1. Exclusively Extraterritorial Use
a. In General
Universally, the courts have rejected any attempt to exercise
eminent domain in one state for the exclusive benefit of another
!state.8 5 The genesis of this principle derived from a subtle interpre-
tation of certain "mill act" 86 cases. 7 For instance, in Salisbury
Mills v. Forsaiths the appellant sought to invoke New Hamp-
shire's "mill act" to sustain the flooding of New Hampshire land
even though its mill was located in Massachusetts. The New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court refused to permit the appellants to rely on
New Hampshire's "mill act," which authorized New Hampshire cor-
porations engaged in milling to take all property flooded by water
dammed for a mill after payment of damages, because the "act
can have no extra-territorial application or effect. 8 9 Ostensibly,
the court was mainly preoccupied with preserving the limited leg-
islative purpose of the act; however, the decision has been gener-
ally interpreted to support the proposition that there are inherent
limitations to the 'extent to which eminent domain may serve an-
other jurisdiction. 90
In People ex. rel. Trompley vs. Humphrey-' the principle was
clearly established that a state may not exercise its power of emi-
nent domain exclusively for another sovereignty, in this case the
federal government. 92 The Michigan legislature, by act, authorized
One State To Condemn Land For a Use in Another State, 13 CORNELL L.J. 88, 89 (1927).
Compare Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1032.
84. NICHOLS § 2.112[4].
85. Id.
86. For a general di.'.cussion of the "mill acts," see Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 118
U.S. 9 (1885).
87. See generally Wooster v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 39 Me. 246 (1855); Salisbury Mills
v. Forsaith, 57 N.H- . 124 (1876).
88. 57 N.H. 124 (1876).
89. Salisbury Mills v. Forsaith, 57 N.H, 124, 127 (1876).
90. See Grover Irr. & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch R. & Irr. Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131 P.43,
60 (1913).
91. 23 Mich. 471 (1871).
92. For a discussion of the propriety of condemnation by a state for the benefit of the
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the governor to condemn land necessary for the construction of fed-
eral lighthouses. After the land was acquired by the state, the state
was to convey title to the federal government. The Supreme Court
of Michigan held the legislative authorization for this procedure un-
constitutional because:
[This case produces] the extraordinary result, that the
state may seize and appropriate the lands of an individual
for the sole purpose of turning it over to the Union for
its needs; . . . while the owner, who was subject to this ob-
ligation only, that he should surrender his property to the
public needs, is found to be deprived of it without just neces-
sity. . . . This simple statement appears to us to demonstrate
that the state can have no such power as has been attemp-
ted to be exercised in the case before us. 93
The court denied the state the right to exercise eminent domain
because the taking exclusively served a federal use. The court did
so on the ground that since the taking exclusively served the fed-
eral government and consequently did not advance any state inter-
est, no necessity existed to justify the state's exercise of eminent
domain. The U. S. Supreme Court acknowledged:
The proper view of the right of eminent domain seems to be,
that it is a right belonging to a sovereignty to take private
property for its own public uses, and not for those of an-
other. Beyond that there exists no necessity; which alone
is the foundation of the right.94
No judicial articulation exists which specifically defines what
is meant by the words "sole" or "exclusive" as employed in the
cases. Nevertheless, the basic meaning of exclusive can be obtain-
ed from an analysis of what has failed to alter a use's "exclusive"
nature. For instance, an "indirect benefit" is insufficient to con-
vert an "exclusive" use into something less than "exclusive. ' 95
As used in the relevent cases, "indirect benefit," apparently, means
any in-state use not directly advancing the legislative authorization
upon which the taking relies.96
To illustrate this definition, in Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v.
Lovella, Ditch, Reservoir & Irrigation Co. 97 the appellee sought to
federal government, see NICHOLS § 2.113; Comment, Constitutional Law: Eminent Do-
main: Power Of One State To Condemn For A Use In Another State, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 88,
90-91 (1927)-.
93. People ex rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 476-77 (1871) (emphasis
added).
94. Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 367, 383-74 (1875).
95. See generally 26 AM. JuR. 2d Eminent Domain § 14 (1966).
96. See Grover Irr. & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, R. & Irr. Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131 P. 43
(1913).
97. 21 Wyo. 204, 131 P. 43 (1913).
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comdemn 750 feet of creek lying north of the Colorado-Wyoming
border for the purpose of erecting a headgate for an irrigation pro-
ject, most of which was in Colorado. The appellee claimed that the
benefit to Wyoming of the economic uplifting which would inure to
the area as a result of the project provided a sufficient "public
use" in Wyoming to justify the taking. The Wyoming Supreme
Court squarely rejected the appellee's claim and denied the taking
for lack of "public use." In doing so, the court said:
[W],e think [the appelee's claim] disregards or miscon-
ceives the theory of public interest supporting the exercise
of eminent domain for irrigation works. . . . [T]he head-
gate and ditch by which water for agricultural purposes is
diverted and distributed is not the use for which land re-
quired for a right of way is taken; the use authorizing such
a taking is the application of the water to the land. The use
. . . therefore occurs where the water is applied; that is
where the land to be irrigated is located. . . . [Here] the
water is to be entirely devoted to the irrigation of the land
in another state, the use will be in and for that state.
While this state may be interested and ever indirectly ben-
efited in the manner above indicated by the reclamation
and settlelment of lands in another state, it would be diffi-
cult, we think, to uphold the exercise 'of eminent domain in
this state .... 98
In an analogous situation, the same result was reached in
People ex. rel. Trombley v. Humphrey,99 noted earlier. Appellee in
that case argued that the taking was not exclusively for the bene-
fit of the federal government. The state as well, suggested the ap-
pellee, would benefit from the federal government's construction of
a lighthouse on Michigan's shoreline. In incisive language, the
court dismissed the appellee's contention because "the act" did not
consider such, a state interest, but assumed the taking to be for the
United States exclusively.0°o Here again, a court rejected the argu-
ment that "indirect benefits" would alter the "exclusive" nature of
a use because such benefits did not directly advance the purpose
of the act authorizing the taking. Thus, "indirect benefits" alone
are inadequate to sustain the exercise of eminent domain.
b. As Applied To Power Lines
As a matter of course, interstate power lines almost never serve
out-of-state consumers to an exclusive extent. However, a pertinent
98. Id. at 59.
99. 23 Mich. 471 (1871).
100. Id. at 478.
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exception can be found. In Clark v. Gulf Power Co. the appellee
sought to condemn a right of way in Florida for an out-flowing, one-
way, interstate power line. In a brief decision, an intermediate
Florida appellate court denied the right of way with these words:
[P]roperty in one state cannot be condemned for the sole
purpose of serving a public use in another state. Conjecture
might be made that electrical current generated in Georgia
will flow into Florida for the benefit of Florida citizens and
vice versa; however, the pleading before us indicates that
a one-way transmission fine is contemplated from which the
citizens of Florida will not derive one iota of benefit. 101
2. Primarily Intraterritorial Use, Incidental Extraterritor-
ial Use.
a. In General
As mentioned above, a taking involving two states seldom is
viewed as exclusively benefiting only one of those states. Instead,
in such cases, the question generally revolves around the authority
of the state in which the taking occurs to condemn for a use that
concurrently serves another state. The proposition is now well es-
tablished that land may be condemned for the primary public use
of the state in which it is situated, even though the taking inciden-
tally serves a use in another state. 10 2
Initially, the early cases only responded to this proposition by
implication. 10 3 However, in Columbus Water Works Co. v. Long'"
the Alabama Supreme Court addressed this issue directly. The ap-
pellant, a foreign water works, sought to condemn land in Alabama
to obtain a larger source of water. The company served two cities
in Alabama and one city in Georgia. Responding to the landowner's
contention that the appellant could not exercise Alabama's power of
eminent domain for use in Georgia, the Alabama Supreme Court
laid down the fundamental rule concerning this issue. The court
stated:
It is equally clear, that this right is not to be denied where
public uses are to be subserved in the state granting con-
demnation because in connection therewith, public uses in
another state may be likewise promoted. While a state will
take care to use this power for the benefit of its own people,
it will not refuse to exercise it for such purpose, because
the inhabitants of a neighboring state may incidentally par-
take of the fruits of its exercise. 0 5
101. 198 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (emphasis added).
102. NICHOLS § 2.112[4].
103. See, e.g., In re Townshend, 39 N.Y. 171 (1868).
104. 121 Ala. 245, 25 So. 702 (1899).
105. Columbus Water Works v. Long, 121 Ala. 245, 25 So. 702, 703-04 (1899) (emphasis
adced).
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The defect in the Columbus rule'0 8 is that the term "incidental-
ly" has been employed ambiguously by the courts which have ap-
plied the rule. For example, in Washington Water Power Co. v.
Waters10 7 the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the taking of lakeshore
property as part of a project to increase the electrical production
of the appellant at two plants, one in Idaho and one in Washington.
Of the total production increase, only one-fifth would be pro-
duced in Idaho. Mainly on the basis of the Columbus rule the court
found the ratio between in-state and out-of-state use to be unimpor-
tant to the right of condemnation. Yet, an out-of-state benefit can
hardly be described as incidental when it represents four times the
quantity of in-state benefit.
As a further example, in Gralapp v. Mississippi Power Co. 108 an
Alabama landowner sued to enjoin the appellee's condemnation of a
right of way for an interstate power line. The landowner demon-
strated that in the past the appellee had delivered fifteen times more
power to Mississippi than it had supplied to Alabama. The landowner,
therefore, claimed that the condemnation should be barred because
its primary, rather than incidental, purpose was to provide power
to Mississippi. Using the Columbus rule, the Alabama Supreme Court
held that the heavy proportion of out-of-state benefit would not pre-
vent the condemnation because Alabama likewise received important
benefits such as improved electrical reliability and reduced electric-
ity costs. Regardless of the fact that Alabama received important
benefit from the power line, it still remained a fact that Mississippi
acquired most of the power sent across the power line. Nevertheless,
according to the application of the Columbus rule, Mississippi was
only "incidentally' benefited. This incongruous result is by no means
an anomaly of the law of this area; there are many cases which
present similar ambiguity in the application of the Columbus rule.10 9
The Columbus rule"' is subject to two acutely different interpre-
tations, depending on whether the word incidentally means "insub-
stantially" or "concurrently". Using "insubstantially," the rule can
106. Id.
107. 19 Idaho 595, 115 P. 682 (1911).
108. 280 Ala. 368, 194 So. 2d 527 (1967).
109. The Alabama Supreme Court did not base the Columbus rule upon some attribute of
sovereignty. Instead, the Alabama court held the Columbus rule to be the proper law be-
cause to refuse to exercise eminent domain "would violate the principle of a just public
policy and the neighborly comity which should exist between states." Id. at 531, citing
Columbus Water Works v. Long, 121 Ala. 245, 25 So. 702, 703 (1899). Similarly, other
cases have Justified the Columbus rule as an expedient of industrial progress and economic
necessity. See Shedd v. State Line Generating Co., 34 F.2d 287, 290 (N.D. Ind. 1929),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 884; Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 595, 115 P.
682 (1911); cf. Recent Decisions, Eminent Domain-Power To Take Land For Use Par-
tially Outside Of The State, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 105, 106 (1928).
Perhaps the absence of a rationale anchored in the nature of sovereignty has left
the law without firm bases upon which to distinguish the rule's application.
110. 280 Ala. 368, 194 So. 2d 527 (1969).
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be interpreted to mean that where a taking in one state also bene-
fits another state, the taking is not affected if the out-of-state bene-
fits are insubstantial in comparison to the in-state benefits. Using
"concurrently," the rule can be interpreted to mean that s'o long as
the exercise of eminent domain is valid within the state doing the
taking, it is immaterial that another state is concurrently benefited.
The second interpretation is the more plausible. Unlike the first in-
terpretation, its application eliminates most of the ambiguity in the
case law.
This conclusion is soundly supported by reasoning and the rule
of law applied in Adams v. Greenwich Water Co.' In that case
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors was petitioned to deny the
appellee the power to condemn land for the use of providing water
to both Greenwich, Connecticut and Rye, New York. The water was
provided to Rye because of a pooling agreement between the ap-
pellee and a New York water company. Both companies benefited
from the arrangement. At the time of trial, appellee provided five
million gallons of water to Greenwich daily and four million gallons
to Rye daily, and the appellee predicted that by the year 1970
these figures would rise to 8.75 million gallons daily and 4.76 million
gallons daily respectively. The court felt that the taking was proper
because:
It is apparently universally held, however, that if a taking
of property by eminent domain is for a public use within the
state authorizing it, such a taking is not to be prevented be-
cause it will also serve a public use in another jurisdiction.
This principle applies even though the major portion of the
public use will benefit non-residents. Thus if the taking is for
a public use which will provide a substantial and direct bene-
fit to the people of the state which authorizes it, it is a pro-
per exercise of the power of eminent domain even though it
also benefits the residents of another state . 2
Note that the rule applied in Adams makes no mention of in-
cidental use and discounts any proportional relationship between in-
traterritorial and extraterritorial use. Read together, Adams and
Columbus must mean that regardless of the nature of any extra-
territorial use, a use which provides substantial and direct benefit
to the state exercising condemnation is sufficient to justify a taking
within that state. 1 3
11.1. 138 Conn. 205, 83 A.2d 177 (1951).
112. Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 138 Conn. 205, 83 A.2d 177, 182 (1951) (emphasis
added).
113. Of. NICHOLS § 2.112[4].
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b. As Applied To Power Lines
A power line right of way may be condemned in one state even
though another state is thereby incidentally benefited. 1 4 Courts focus
their attention in such situations on the in-state benefit to be derived
from the power line and do not appear to be concerned with the re-
lative proportion, quantitative or otherwise, of out-of-state benefits."15
Furthermore, the courts often consider benefits other than those nf
a quantitative nature when determining whether an interstate power
line serves an in-state "public use." For instance, an electric utility
did not exceed statutory authority when it condemned private pro-
perty for the purpose of constructing a transmission line to -serve as
a "back-up" line to supply emergency electricity and to increase
the reliability of its power transmission network. 1 6 Likewise, even
where a greater proportion of the power is directed out-of-state, the
condemnation of an interstate power line right of way may be sup-
ported by the fact that the power line may provide power to meet
in-state residents' future demands." 7 And, although most of the elec-
tricity from an interstate power line is likely to be sent elsewhere,
a state may permit a right of way to be condemned because the po-
wer line will also assist in reducing electricity costs. 118
3. Primarily Extraterritorial Use, Incidental Intraterritoria
Use
a. In General
If a taking is a valid exercise of eminent domain it is immaterial
that another state is also benefited thereby)' 9 Nor does it matter
that another state receives the primary benefit of the taking as long
as the state authorizing the taking is substantially and directly bene-
fited. 20 To illustrate, In Roger v. Toccoa Electric Power'2 a Georgia
landowner petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court to deny the respon-
114. See Gralapp v. Mississippi Power Co., 280 Ala. 368, 194 So. 2d 527, 531 (1967) ;
Shedd v. Northern Ind. Pub. Ser. Co., 206 Ind. 35, 188 N.E. 322, 325-26 (1934); Indiana
& Michigan Elec. Co. v. Miller, 1 Mich. App. 16, 172 N.W.2d 223, 230 (1969).
115. Id
116. J. M. Foster Co. v. Nortern Ind. Pub. Ser. Co., 326 N.E.2d 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
117. Cf. note 24 and accompanying text supra.
118. See, e.g., Gralapp v. Mississippi Power Co., 280 Ala. 368, 194 So. 2d 527 (1967).
119. See NICHOLS § 2.112[4]. See generally Shedd v. State Line Generating Co., 34 F.2d
2S7 (7th Cir. 1929) ; Colgate v. Philadelphia Elec. Power Co., 20 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1927),
appeal dismissed, 276 U.S. 589 (1927) ; Gralapp v. Mississippi Power Co., 280 Ala. 368,
194 So. 2d 527 (1967) ; Black v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 236 Ark. 447, 366 S.W.2d
899 (1963) ; Rogers v. Toccoa Blee. Power Co., 162 Ga. 919, 137 S.E. 272 (1927); Shedd
v. Northern Ind. Power Ser. Co., 206 Ind. 35, 188 N.E. 322 (1934) ; Lakehead Pipeland Co.
v. Dehn, 340 Mich. 25, 54 N.W.2d 903 (1954) ; Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. Miller, 19
Mich. App. 16, 172 N.W.2d 223 (Ct. of App. 1969) ; In re Townshend', 39 N.Y. 171 (1868) ;
Broule Elec. Co. v. Beall, 96 W. Va. 637, 123 S.E. 587 (1924) ; Carnegie Nat. Gas Co. v.
Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557, 79 S.E. 3 (1913).
120. Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 138 Conn. 205, 83 A.2d 177, 182 (1951).
121. 162 Ga. 919, 137 S.E. 272 (1927).
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dent the authority to condemn his land. The respondent power com-
pany intended to flood the petitioner's property in order to create a
source of water power for the generation of electricity. The project
was expected to produce 35,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity an-
nually. The respondent intended to deliver all but 25,000 kilowatt-
hours per year to Tennessee. If the demand in Georgia increased,
the respondent would supply the power; but, there was no evidence
that the consumption in Georgia would increase to any appreciable
degree. The pertinent issue became whether the taking in Georgia
was valid even though the major portion of the benefit from the tak-
ing accrued to Tennessee.
Obviously, the Columbus rule 122 was not quite appropriate in this
case. The fact that only .07 percent of the electricity would be re-
ceived by the state in which the land taken was situated, while
99.93 percent flowed out-of-state, clearly necessitated a more precise
rule than that found in Columbus. Indeed, the dissent of Judge Beck
in Rogers effectively articulated the distinction between the Colum-
bus rule and the facts in Rogers when it stated:
It is also a recognized principle that the fact that a neighbor-
ing state may incidentally partake of the fruits of the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain will not be ground for
enjoining the exercise of the right of a corporation which has
been vested with that right. But in this case it plainly appears
that the citizens of the state 'of Georgia, which has vested the
corporation here in question with the right of eminent domain,
will not enjoy more than an insignificant part of the fruits
of the exercise of that power. The service to the citizens of
Georgia will be incidental, while the main purpose is to pro-
duce electrical power which will be delivered to a foreign
corporation in a foreign state .... 123
However, the majority reasoned that whether a taking served a
public use depended upon the right of the people in the state authoriz-
ing the taking to enjoy such use and not upon the amount of the
use the public actually enjoyed. 1 24 The court found that the assur-
ance that Georgia could obtain the electricity that it needed esta-
blished public use sufficient to sustain the taking. Moreover, even
though Georgia initially would receive only a miniscule amount
(.07%) of the electricity which was produced as a result of the tak-
ing while Tennessee obtained the remaining 99.93%, the court, cit-
ing Columbus, held that the concurrent use in Tennessee did not de-
122. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
123. Roger v. Toccoa Elec. P. Co., 162 Ga. 919, 137 S.E. 272, 275 (1927) (emphasis
supplied).
124. Id. at - , 137 S.E. at 274.
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stroy the validity of the taking. By implication, therefore, the deci-
sion has been commonly interpreted to mean that even where a tak-
ing primarily serves an extraterritorial use, with only incidental in-
traterritorial use, the exercise of the power of eminent domain will
be upheld. 12
5
Other cases also suggest this conclusion. For instance, where one
state authorized the taking of land for the formation of a lake to
serve as a canal-terminus, a court upheld the taking as providing
sufficient public use even though the purpose of the taking was to
aid the canal, which principally served another state. 12 Similarly,
where a natural gas pipeline served only a few residents in West
Virginia and distributed gas mainly to residents in Pennsylvania,
the Supreme Court of West Virginia sustained the condemnation of
land in that state for the pipeline.1 2 7
b. As Applied To Power Lines
Because interstate power lines often distribute their benefit un-
evenly between the states they serve, courts are frequently called
upon to scrutinize the proportion of in-state to out-of-state use pro-
vided by the power line. In general, the courts have appeared to ap-
ply the principle that the relative proportion of in-state to out-of-state
use provided by the construction of an interstate power line is imma-
terial. 128 However, an interstate power line which exclusively serves
an out-of-state purpose does not provide a "public use" to the con-
demning state.12 9 In ascertaining whether an interstate power line
serves a "public use" in a given state, what appears to be most signif-
icant is whether the taking provides a substantial and direct bene-
fit to the taking state.110 For example, the fact that a state would
receive only one-sixteenth of the electricity flowing along an inter-
state power line did not concern the court deciding the validity of
its "public use" as much as the fact that the state would receive
emergency protection, reduced electricity costs, and additional elec-
tricity. 31 Hence, the focus in determining the issue of "public use"
of an interstate power line appears to be directed toward what
benefit the taking state will receive as a result of the condemna-
tion, irrespective of whether that benefit is primary or incidental
to the taking as a whole.
125. See generally NICHOLS § 2.112[4]; 25 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § (1966).
Each of these authorities propose that a state may validly exercise its power of eminent
domain even though the major portion of the public use applies to non-residents.
126. In re Townshend, 39 N.Y. 171 (1868).
127. Carnegie Nat: Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557, 79 S.E. 3 (1913).
128. Cf. Gralapp v. Mississippi Power Co., 280 Ala. 368, 184 So. 2d 527 (1967) ; Shedd v.
Northern Indiana Pub. Ser. Co., 206 Ind. 35, 188 N.E. 322 (1934).
129. Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
130. Cf. Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 138 Conn. 205, 83 A.2d 177, 182 (1951).
131. See Gralapp v. Mississippi Power Co., 280 Ala. 368, 194 So. 2d 527 (1967).
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V. RETURNING TO SQUARE BUTTE
When compared to the other cases involving interstate public
use and transmission lines, Square Butte 32 looks very unique. Be-
cause the D.C. line must transmit one-way and must travel untapped
to its terminus, the primary purpose of the line seems to be to bene-
fit Minnesota. The plaintiff electric cooperative alleged several col-
lateral benefits such as additional power for North Dakota and im-
proved electrical reliability. This makes the case resemble -a pendu-
lum; first it swings one way and then it moves the other way. The
taking can be denied because North Dakota receives no direct bene-
fit, or it can be sustained because North Dakota acquires "enough"
benefit.
The Adams rule' 33 which the trial judge apparently followed,
would seem to be determinative in this case. Under this rule, the
relative proportion of in-state to out-of-state use is immaterial. 13 4 In-
stead, the taking serves a "public use" if it provides substantial and
direct benefit to the state exercising the taking.13 5 In Square Butte
terms, this means that if the D.C. line substantially and directly
benefits North Dakota it serves a "public use" in North Dakota, re-
gardless of the benefit concurrently provided to Minnesota. How-
ever, the trail court determined that the benefit to North Dakota was
"remote, speculative, and indirect,' '1 36 and accordingly dissallowed
the proposed condemnation.
Square Butte is now on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme
Court. Should the trial court be upheld, two alternatives exist by
which condemnation of the land in North Dakota could be accom-
plished. First, the electric cooperative could procure federal legis-
lation authorizing the condemnation of land necessary to construct
power lines from power plants fueled by North Dakota lignite. How-
ever, such legislation would take several years to pass Congress be-
cause of the conflicting interests involved.1 3 7 Second, the electric co-
operative could amend its proposal to insure North Dakota with sub -
stantial and direct benefit from the construction of the D.C. line.
Such alteration in the project could take many forms. As just one
132. Square Butte Elev. Coop. v. Hilken, Civil No. 24097 (N.D. 4th dist., filed Aug. 14,
1975). This decision presently is on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court.
133. See note 111 supra.
134. See note 119 supra.
135. Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 138 Conn. 205, 83 A.2d 177, 182 (1951).
136. Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Hilken, Civil No. 24097 (N.D. 4th dist., filed Aug. 14,
1975).
137. Some of the conflicting interests In this situation might be the railroads, farmers.
coal developers and utilities. The railroads would prefer to see the coal transported by train
instead of transmitting the power over power lines. The farmers are inflamed by any
prospective taking of their lands. The coal developers and utilities would prefer to see a
broad condemnation authority that would sustain their plans for energy development and
conversion.
NOTES
example, North Dakota might be guaranteed receipt of a more
significant proportion of the power flowing over the D.C. line.
VI. CONCLUSION
Eminent domain cannot be exercised without a showing of "pub-
lic use." What constitutes "public use" depends upon the nature of
the public "employment" or "advantages" produced by the taking.
Where more than one state may be benefited by a taking, the rela-
tive proportion of in-state to out-of-state benefits is immaterial to the
issue of "public use." What is important is that the state exercising
the power of eminent domain enjoy a "substantial and direct bene-
fit" as a result of the taking. However, the courts have been quite
liberal in deciding what constitutes a "substantial and direct benefit."
Consequently, the interstate character of a "public use," in general,
has presented little resistance to the exercise of eminent domain.
The trial court decision in Square Butte took a close look at
the alleged advantages of the proposed D.C. line to North Dakota
but found no substantial and direct benefits to North Dakota. Con-
sequently, there existed no "public use" to North Dakota. If the trial
court's decision is affirmed on appeal, the result could be construed
to indicate that whenever the issue of interstate public use arises,
the "public use" to the state doing the taking will be carefully
scrutinized in order to guarantee sufficient benefits to justify the ex-
ercise of eminent domain. In comparison to previous cases, such an
approach would tend to constrict to some degree the exercise of
eminent domain in takings of an interstate character. Any broad at-
tempt by the states to do this could induce the federal government
to expand the federal power of eminent domain in order to protect
interstate commerce. Should this occur, the states would forfeit signifi-
cant control over the interstate exercise of eminent domain. There-
fore, the final outcome in Square Butte and future cases like it will
play an integra role in determining the role states will play in inter-
state condemnation.
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